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In January 1968, in a case involving the Libbey-Owens-Ford
Company,' three members of the National Labor Relations Board,
over the bitter dissent of the other two Board members, converted a
hitherto little known procedure termed "unit clarification" into a
mechanism which permits unions to expand the scope of multiplant
bargaining, regardless of employer opposition and without adequate
examination of the employees' alternate desires. This Board action
is now beginning to generate a series of union attempts to gain ex-
panded bargaining units that they have been unable to win through
collective bargaining. It threatens to broaden considerably the area
of industrial dispute.
After a brief discussion of the sources of NLRB authority, this
Article examines the history, role, and use of the unit clarification pro-
cedure and contrasts this role and use with the NLRB's recent deci-
sion in Libbey-Owens-Ford. The final section studies the implications
of the NRLB's abrupt departure from past practice.
I. THE SOURCES AND LIMITS OF NLRB AUTHORITY
Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 states
that the national policy is "to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
t Instructor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1965, LL.B. 1968,
Boston University. Member, Massachusetts Bar.
I Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec.
29,001 (Jan. 12, 1968).
2 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . ." The
task of implementing this policy was assigned to the National Labor
Relations Board.' The Act also provides the Board with a policy,
statutory mandates, and considerable, although limited, discretion. As
the Supreme Court noted: "When Congress passes an Act empowering
administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power
of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted." 4 Section
9 of the Act gives the NLRB the duty and authority first to determine
the appropriate unit for collective bargaining and then to conduct an
election within this unit to decide which union, if any, shall represent
the employees.5 Section 9 (b) provides in part that:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof ....
Subsection (b) goes on to restrict the Board's authority in cases in-
volving craft units and units involving employees who are professionals
and those who are guards.
One of the most controversial restrictions on unit determinations
is found in section 9(c) (5) of the Act.1 Under this mandate the
Board is prohibited from using the extent to which employees have been
organized as a controlling factor in setting the size of the unit. Al-
though it is undeniable that this clause limits the authority granted
in subsection (b), there has been great controversy over whether section
9(c) (1) also restricts subsection (b). Section 9(c) (1) provides that:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board...
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reason-
able cause to believe that a question of representation affecting
commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon
due notice.... If the Board finds upon the record of such
hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof.S
329 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
4 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944).
529 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
629 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
729 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1964).
829 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964) (emphasis added).
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The disagreement revolves around the issue whether a "question of
representation" must exist before the Board can exercise the authority
granted under section 9(b). The General Counsel of the NLRB
has argued that the Board has been given "a general grant of authority
... to determine appropriate bargaining units-an authority bounded
[only] by several express, limiting provisions." 9 However, the op-
posing viewpoints maintain that subsection (b) does not exist in a
vacuum and therefore section 9 must be read in its entirety.' Con-
sidered in the context of the entire section, the words "in each case"
found in subsection (b), might refer to the representation cases dis-
cussed in subsection (c). Furthermore, since 9(c) (5) admittedly
restricts subsection (b), then it logically follows that section 9(c) (1)
can also be read as a restriction. The NLRB has never accepted this
interpretation, but has developed techniques to clarify ambiguities even
where no question of representation exists.
Because changes in circumstances might dictate changes in a
continuing employer-employee relationship, the Board has stated that
unit determinations, made at the first step in the collective bargaining
process, are not immutable. Accordingly, a procedure-appropriately
entitled "unit clarification"-has been provided whereby disputes over
the delineation of an existing unit may be resolved.
It is certainly not contended here that the intended use of the
clarification petition is in any way improper. It is, however, the thesis
of this Article that the National Labor Relations Board has recently
abused the clarification petition's intended use by utilizing it as a mech-
anism to merge existing bargaining units. It is contended further
that the strict mandate of section 9(c) (1), requiring the presence of
a question of representation before the secret ballot election may be
used, has been circumvented." An examination of the traditional uses
of the unit clarification procedure and then of the Libbey-Owens-Ford
case should serve to confirm this analysis.
II. HISTORY OF THE UNIT CLARIFICATION PETITION
The dynamics of any employment relationship dictate that the
adjudicator of this relationship must be provided with a certain degree
of flexibility. The Congress of the United States recognized this need
9 Brief for Appellant at 8, McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
TO Brief for Employer at 39-40, PPG Industries, Inc., No. 6-UC-8 (N.L.R.B.,
filed Dec. 9, 1966).
"lSee also A. MCFARAND & W. BIsHoP, UNIoN AUTHORIZATION CARDS AND
THE NLRB (U. Pa. Labor Relations and Public Policy Series Rep. No. 2, 1969), in
which it is argued that the NLRB has also circumvented the secret ballot election
requirement by granting representation rights on the basis of authorization cards.
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in the National Labor Relations Act. Section 10(d) of that Act
provides:
Until the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as
hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time upon reason-
able notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper,
modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order
made or issued by it.'
Pursuant to the power granted in section 10(d), and the authority
granted in section 9 of the Act, the NLRB enacted rule 102.60(b)
of its Rules and Regulations. 3 It is therein provided that "[a]
petition for clarification of an existing bargaining unit or a petition
for amendment or certification, 4 in the absence of a question concern-
ing representation, may be filed by a labor organization or by an
employer." '5
Referring again to rule 102.60(b), it can be seen that neither the
unit clarification nor the amendment of certification petition may be
used where a "question concerning representation" exists. The Board
has consistently held that where a question of representation is present,
the petition for clarification must be dismissed and that the proper
procedure is a petition seeking an election pursuant to section 9(c)
1229 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1964).
1329 C.F.R. §102.60(b) (1968). NLRB determinations in representation pro-
ceedings are not considered final orders within § 10 of the Act. Accordingly, such
determinations are subject to judicial review only when they are incidental to a review
of an unfair labor order. Because of this, § 10(d), which is applicable to unfair labor
practice proceedings, can be considered as implicitly approving the concomitant power
associated with § 9 of the Act. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 375 U.S. 261
(1964) in which the Supreme Court gave tacit approval to the Board's enactment
of the Rule.
14 Although the wording of the Rule appears to imply that the unit clarification
petition and the amendment of certification may be used interchangeably, certain
differences have evolved. From its inception, the amendment of certification was
intended to be used only by a certified union, as evidenced by the petition form which
requires the case number in which certification was granted. Prior to 1957, the NLRB
had never questioned the propriety of an uncertified union using the motion to clarify
(the name then used for the unit clarification petition). However, in Bell Telephone
Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 371 (1957), the Board concluded that no "legal power" can be
derived from the Act with regard to an uncertified union. Denied the benefits of Rule
102.60(b) as a result of this decision, an uncertified union was compelled to seek either
certification or a settlement with the employer. The latter alternative, although pro-
moted by the NLRA, was difficult because of the lack of consistent guidelines in
previous NLRB decisions which could have served as a basis for agreement. Choosing
the former would also present serious problems for the union. For example, a "ques-
tion of representation" would have to be found to exist; such a determination and its
related election leave other labor organizations free to compete for the right to
exclusive representation of the bargaining unit-something the union would like
to avoid.
In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1964),
the NLRB reversed Bell Telephone Co. Although this decision left both certified
and uncertified unions free to use the unit clarification petition, certified unions nor-
mally use the amendment of certification procedure, which is still denied to the
uncertified union.
15 See also 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1969).
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of the Act. 6 The reason for the Board's rule that the unit clarification
and amendment of certification petition may only be used in the
absence of a question concerning representation is easily discernible.
Section 9(c) (1) of the Act provides for a specific procedure where
the Board determines that a question of representation does exist.'
7
Absent such a determination neither the employer nor the union may
file a representation petition.'
8
It is certainly obvious that a ruling concerning the presence or
absence of a question relating to representation may well be determina-
tive of the propriety of a particular procedure.'" But the Act does not
contain any comprehensive definition of what in fact constitutes such
a question, although certain sections do provide some indication of
the legislative intent. Section 9(c) (1) (A) (i), for example, provides
for the filing of a petition by a labor organization which alleges that
a substantial number of employees desire collective bargaining while
their employer declines to recognize their representative. Based on
this mandate, the Board has concluded that where the employer de-
clines to recognize a union asserting representative status, inter alia,
there is a question concerning representation.20
The question then is whether the inverse situation holds true.
Does the absence of an employer's declination or refusal to recognize
the petitioning union require a per se ruling that no question of
representation exists? This issue was raised in the case of General
Box Co." The employer there resisted the union's representation
petition on the grounds that it recognized the petitioner, and therefore
no question of representation existed. The labor organization argued
that because certified bargaining agents are given advantages and
benefits which recognized unions do not enjoy, there exists a repre-
sentation question.
'
43 See News Syndicate Co., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 27,780
(1967); Howmet Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 27,403
(1967) ; Standard Oil Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1964) ; General Elec. Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
88 (1963); Dayton Power & Light Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 337 (1962).
17 See American Stores Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 678 (1961).
18 The "certification of representative" petition and the "representation" petition
both constitute the proper procedure for requesting a § 9(c) (1) election. The distinc-
tion is that the former is used by a labor organization while the latter is filed by
the petitioning employer.
19 While a question concerning representation must be present to maintain a
representation petition, the Board will, sua sponte, convert the petition to a unit clarifi-
cation petition when necessary. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 133 N.L.RB. 762 (1961).
20 "The Board initially considers in [representation] proceedings whether or not
a question concerning representation has arisen, and generally finds that it is the case
if the employer has refused to recognize a union seeking to bargain collectively for
employees in a given unit." 10 NLRB Ai. REP. 16 (1945).
2182 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949).
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The Board concluded that "an employer's recognition of a union
which asserts representative status does not, in and of itself, negate
the existence of a question concerning representations." ' The Board
then determined that, in this case, there were sufficient facts to consti-
tute a representation question. First, the petitioner asserted a majority
standing; second, it expressed a desire to secure a certificate; and finally,
it filed a formal petition asking for an election."
One need not be an expert in labor law to realize that the facts
found to be sufficient in that case are common in every case in which
a petition is filed under section 9(c) (1). Moreover, the Board's third
statement is circular. The Board reasons that in order to file a repre-
sentation petition, a question concerning representation must exist.
However, the mere filing of such a petition tends to create a representa-
tion question. Thus, despite the employer's voluntary recognition, an un-
certified union may successfully file a petition under section 9(c) (1).
The deterrent to a union filing such a petition is that it allows outside
organizations to compete for bargaining rights. On the other hand, a
representation proceeding affords the employees the greatest freedom
of choice, which is not true of the unit clarification petition. Moreover,
as will be pointed out below, the unit clarification procedure can be used
to extend union power at the expense of both the employees and the
employer without full recognition of the rights of either of the latter.
III. TRADITIONAL USES OF THE UNIT CLARIFICATION PETITION
Unit clarification has been used in two general areas: cases in-
volving a new or uncertain job classification and cases in which the
petitioning party alleges that expanded operations constitute an accre-
tion to the existing bargaining unit. The Board itself has stated that:
Clarification of a certification or amendment of a unit
description may be in order where a new employee classifica-
tion has been created, or an employer's operations have been
expanded subsequent to a certification, and the employees in-
volved are normal accretions to the certified unit.2 4
A. Dispute Over Job Classifications
1. Traditional Dispute
Westinghouse Electric Corporation ' illustrates the use of the unit
clarification petition where the parties are in conflict over job classifi-
22 Id. at 682.
2 3Id. at 682-83.
24 Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 146 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1191 (1964).
25142 N.L.R.B. 317 (1963). See also Boston Gas Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 219 (1962),
which involves the identical problem.
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cations. The union's certification covered all employees with the
exception of the specific exclusion of "manufacturing engineers." Dur-
ing the period of a collective bargaining agreement, Westinghouse
employed certain personnel whom they classified as manufacturing
engineers. In their unit clarification petition the labor organization
alleged that despite the employer's classification the new employees
were part of the bargaining unit. The Board ruled that the disputed
employees performed duties that were typical of manufacturing engi-
neers. Since these employees historically were excluded from the
bargaining unit, the Board dismissed the petition.
2. Altered Employment Status and the Employer's Dilemma
Another situation in which the clarification petition has been used
extensively is that in which an employer transfers employees into and
out of the bargaining unit. If management were given unfettered
discretion to transfer employees out of an existing bargaining unit,
the effectiveness of collective bargaining would, of course, be greatly
diminished. Decreasing the size of the unit might sharply decrease the
bargaining power of the union. On the other hand, restricting a
firm's right to move employees could prove an imposing barrier to an
efficient and economic allocation of resources. The clarification pro-
cedure provides a means for the Board to balance these conflicting
interests. In reaching a decision concerning the merits of the unit
clarification petition, the Board examines the nature of the new employ-
ment and the potential effects of the transfer. 6 A similar consideration
has been used to resolve disputes concerning the status of summer
employees. 7
Where a firm's employees are organized in two or more bargaining
units represented by different labor organizations, a movement of
personnel between units may create union rivalry and disrupt the
company's production. The NLRB was confronted with this problem
in Libby, McNeill & Libby.' The Packinghouse Workers repre-
sented all packinghouse employees, while the United Steelworkers were
certified to represent manufacturing employees located in an adjoining
plant. For business reasons, the employer transferred depalletizing
machiners from the manufacturing plant to the canning plant. The
Steelworkers claimed a continuing right to represent the transferred
employees, since the move did not change the true nature of the employ-
ment. Simultaneously, the Packinghouse Workers claimed representa-
26See, e.g., Formica Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 433 (1963).
27B. 3. Carney Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1966).
28 159 N.L.R.B. 677 (1966).
1969]
1082 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.117:1075
tion rights because the new employees constituted an accretion to its
bargaining unit. By accepting either argument the employer would
have immediately subjected himself to an unfair labor practice charge
based on section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA.' The Board resolved this
tripartite conflict by an adjudication based on the clarification petitions
filed by all parties.
In situations such as that in the Libby case, the employer finds
himself in a precarious position. If, for example, the company were to
have continued bargaining with the losing party over the transferred
employees, the NLRB would have found it guilty of an unfair labor
practice. Such a result is a high price to charge the employer for
making what, even in retrospect, would have been a reasonable decision.
An optimal solution would be to have the involved parties examine
prior Board decisions and thereby determine who should properly
represent the disputed employees. Such a solution would certainly
yield large savings in both time and money. Furthermore, the parties
would be able to reach a compromise without outside intervention-a
legislative policy clearly endorsed by the Act. Unfortunately, incon-
sistencies in NLRB decisions could well prevent any successful imple-
mentation of this solution. Even the most astute students of industrial
relations are strained to reconcile many Board decisions." Since the
parties are understandably reluctant to "gamble," they must resort
to the most expedient Board procedure-the unit clarification petition.
B. Traditional Problems of Jurisdiction in
Job Classification Disputes
A question raised in conjunction with job classification cases
concerns the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Juris-
diction depends upon the nature of the controversy. If the controversy
is whether certain work should be performed by workers in one bar-
gaining unit or those in another, then section 8(b) (4) (D) of the
NLRA is applicable. This section provides that where there is contro-
versy over work assignments, the Board may only act when there is a
strike or the threat of a strike. On the other hand, where the con-
troversy involves which union should represent the employees doing a
certain type of work, section 9 is applicable, and the unit clarification
petition may be utilized.
29 Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, "subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)." This latter section states that
the designated representative shall be the exclusive representative for all employees in
the bargaining unit.
3o For an illustration of inconsistent NLRB decisions, see Comment, 47 B.U. L.
Rxv. 139 (1967).
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This jurisdictional problem was confronted by the Supreme Court
in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp."' The International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE) was the exclusive
representative for the production and maintenance employees at one of
Westinghouse's plants. Another union, the Federation of Independent
Westinghouse Salaried Unions, represented all salaried and technical
workers at the same plant, excluding all plant and maintenance per-
sonnel. The IUE filed a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement alleging that certain employees now represented by the
Federation were doing plant and maintenance work. Westinghouse
contended that the controversy was a representation question and within
the jurisdiction of the NLRB and refused to arbitrate. Subsequently,
the IUE petitioned a New York supreme court for an injunction against
the employer, which was subsequently denied.32 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the New York courts and
granted IUE's request. After making the fine distinction between work
assignment controversies and representation issues, the Court stated
that "the Board clarifies certificates where a certified union seeks to
represent additional employees; but it will not entertain a motion to
clarify a certificate where the union merely seeks additional work for
employees already within its unit." "' The Court was also forced to
decide whether the state court had jurisdiction. It concluded that a
state court or an arbitrator may entertain jurisdiction regardless of the
nature of the controversy-work assignment or representation-since
there was no danger that they could usurp the power of the NLRB,
when "[t]he superior authority of the Board may be invoked at any
time." 33a
Justice Hugo Black, dissenting with Justice Clark, reasoned that
requiring arbitration ex parte for the Federation is offensive to due
process because the arbitrator's award-although not binding on Board
or court-is in the words of the majority "persuasive." Second, the
employer could be sued under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 34 in
either state or federal court for an alleged contract violation arising out
of his failure to bargain with the right union. The employer must guess
which of his employees he will be instructed to assign to the jobs by
an arbitrator, the Board, or a court. Objecting to a penalty for pre-
dictive error, Justice Black commented:
31375 U.S. 261 (1964).
3215 App. Div. 2d 7, 221 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1961) (affirming and modifying unreported
Special Term decision), aff'd 11 N.Y2d 452, 184 N.E.2d 298, 230 N.Y.S2d 703 (1962),
rev'd 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
-3 375 U.S. at 268-69.
33aId. at 272.
3429 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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If he happens to guess wrong, he is liable to be mulcted in
damages. . . . The Court's holding, thus subjecting an
employer to damages when he has done nothing wrong, seems
to me contrary to the National Labor Relations Act as well
as to the principles of common everyday justice.35
As a result of the majority's decision in Carey, the IUE's grievance
petition went to an arbitrator who decided to split the representation
rights between the two labor organizations. Dissatisfied with this
award, the employer filed a unit clarification petition before the Board,
which granted exclusive representation rights to the Federation con-
cluding that the arbitrator's award was ineffective because all of the
parties involved were not represented in the proceeding, and also
because there were two contracts involved. Thus, four years after
the Supreme Court's decision the controversy in Carey was finally
settled.36
McDonnell Company, ' a recent case in which the Board was
again confronted with the conflict between a work assignment issue
and a representation issue, further illustrates the adverse effects of the
decision in Carey. The International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW) represented the construction and maintenance em-
ployees, while the International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers represented production personnel. Both organizations
claimed representation rights for certain "circuit analyzers." Early in
1965, the Machinists initiated and emerged victorious in arbitration
proceedings from which the IBEW was excluded. Subsequently, the
IBEW received an award in a separate arbitration proceeding in which
the Machinists did not participate.
When the IBEW sued to enforce their arbitration award and to
declare the earlier arbitrator's award null and void, the Machinists
intervened and requested enforcement of the award favoring them.
Victimized by this jurisdictional dispute, the employer filed a unit
clarification petition, and the district court granted a stay of all pro-
ceedings pending disposition of the Board hearing.
Based on Carey, the majority of the Board reasoned that the
dispute involved a representation and not 'a work assignment issue.
The two dissenting members, who would have dismissed the clarifica-
tion proceeding as involving a work assignment issue, also based their
decision on Carey. It took almost four years, two arbitrators, a federal
85 375 U.S. at 275.
36 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 27,247
(1967).
37 McDonnell Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,413 (1968);
see ABC, 112 N.L.R.B. 605 (1956).
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district court and the National Labor Relations Board to settle a simple
bargaining unit clarification. Given the lack of NLRB guidelines, the
unit clarification petition eventually proved to be the best solution.
C. The Accretion Issue
Cases in which there has been an increase in the level of employ-
ment compose another area in which the unit clarification procedure
has traditionally been utilized. A typical increase might be caused by
an expansion in the employer's labor force or by the acquisition of
another plant through purchase or merger. In situations such as these
the NLRB must determine whether the addition is an accretion to the
existing bargaining unit or a new grouping of employees which requires
a representation election under section 9(c) (1).
Such a determination is vital to the employer, the labor organiza-
tion, and the employees. Where, for example, there is a mere addition
of a department to a single store, a finding of a new unit would require
an election that would harvest all the typical pressures of union elections.
Management would also face the possibility of work stoppages and
boycotts from more than one union, and the difficulty of bargaining
with several unions representing employees with the same community
of interest. On the other hand, a determination that an entirely
distinct group of employees exists, having separate duties, functions,
and interests, is an accretion to the existing unit which would require
the company to fit a new factual situation into an existing bargaining
structure and to incorporate contract provisions based on policies that
were developed without consideration of the later addition. Where
two groups of employees do not share a community of interests,
separate elections must be provided in order to assure the employees
"the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by [the]
Act." 38 To do otherwise, would deny employees the right, supposedly
guaranteed by the Act, to choose whether they wish to be represented
and, if so, by whom.
When determining whether the disputed employees constitute an
accretion the Board examines certain factors to ascertain whether
a community of interests exists. Such factors include the history of
the bargaining unit," the geographic proximity or isolation of the
new employees, 0 the functions, duties, and skills of the entire work
force,4 and the administrative territories or subdivisions of the em-
38 National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
39 Brockton Taunton Gas Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 940 (1961).
40 Fox Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 320 (1966); Gas Serv. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963).
41 Worthington Crop., 155 N.L.R.B. 222 (1965); Gas Serv. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 445
(1963).
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ployer.' In a recent case4 3 that clearly illustrates the Board's use
of these various factors, the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers alleged in a unit clarification petition that certain salaried
warehouse employees constituted an accretion in an existing unit.
Before Westinghouse expanded its Hillside, New Jersey, operations
by moving a warehouse there from Newark, the labor organization
was the exclusive bargaining representative for all salaried workers in
the employer's Hillside manufacturing and repair department. Finding
that the warehouse department was physically separate from the manu-
facturing and repair department, and that the supervision and functions
of the employees were distinct, the Board ruled that the petition for
clarification was an improper procedure for resolving the issue, and
held that representation rights could only be gained through a section
9(c) (1) election."
An examination of a number of cases involving alleged accretions
has shown that the NLRB has used these so-called "factors" incon-
sistently. Although each factor, taken by itself, can be the basis for a
given result, if more weight is given to one factor than another, a
different or inconsistent result may prevail. These inconsistencies have
placed the employer in the unenviable position which Justice Black
found objectionable in his dissent in Carey: that is, an employer who
bargains with the wrong union commits an unfair labor practice and is
liable for damages under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, even
if he has acted reasonably. 5 Such a holding certainly seems to contra-
vene the policies of the NLRA and to violate any sense of justice and
fairness.
While providing some relief, the unit clarification procedure should
not be considered the "optimal" solution, due to the fact that it requires
the intervention of an external agency in contravention of the national
42 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec.
25,437 (1968) ; Pacific States Steel Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1961).
43Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dee
25,437 (1968). For a discussion of the NLRB's use of these factors, see Note, The
Board and Section 9(c)(5): Multi-Location and Single-Location Bargaining Units
in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 HARV. L. REv. 811 (1966).
44 Whenever a unit clarification procedure alleges an accretion to an existing
unit, the Board must examine substantive arguments to determine the propriety of
the procedure. If these substantive arguments are rejected, the petition is dismissed,
but this is not a finding for the respondent.
45 In the case of NLRB v. Spartans Indus., Inc., 406 F2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1969),
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced a Labor Board order holding the employer
guilty of an unfair labor practice on the grounds that the company had recognized
one of 2 contesting unions as the proper bargaining agent for employees at a new store.
At the outset of the dispute the employer remained neutral and refrained from trans-
ferring old employees to the new store. However, because of pressing economic
considerations, it became necessary to recognize one of the unions. The NLRB
ruled that despite the economic realities of the situation and the reasonableness of the
employer's decision, the granting of recognition constituted a violation of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
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policy of free collective bargaining. However, the recent decision of
the Supreme Court in Transportation-Communication Employees Union
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co."0 provides the basis for a promising
solution.
In 1952, the Union Pacific Railroad Company placed into opera-
tion a computer system which automatically performed the communi-
cations functions previously done by telegraphers represented by the
Transportation-Communication Employees (T-C) Union. Operation
of the computers was assigned to clerks represented by the Brother-
hood of Railway Clerks. The T-C Union brought a claim to the
National Railroad Adjustment Board that the computer work should
be performed by the telegraphers. After the Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks refused to participate, the Board found for the telegraphers. A
petition for enforcement of the Board's award was filed in the federal
district court, which dismissed the case, as the Supreme Court later
noted, "on the ground that the clerk's union was an indispensable party,
and that the telegraphers, though given the opportunity, refused to make
it a party." 17 The court of appeals affirmed this decision 48 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In an opinion written by Justice Black, who dissented with Justice
Clark, in Carey, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower
courts and remanded the case to the Adjustment Board. Justice Black
noted first that collective bargaining agreements, unlike ordinary con-
tracts for the sale of goods or services, must be considered in conjunction
with all other related collective bargaining agreements, as well as trade
practice and custom. He then criticized the past practice of requiring
two bilateral actions to resolve a trilateral problem. To correct this,
the Court remanded the case to the Adjustment Board and directed it
to give the Railway Clerks
an opportunity to be heard, and, whether or not the clerks'
union accepts this opportunity, to resolve this entire dispute
upon consideration not only of the contracts between the rail-
road and the telegraphers, but "in light of . . . [contracts]
between the railroad" and any other union "involved" in the
overall dispute, and upon consideration of "evidence as to
usage, practice and custom" pertinent to all these agreements.
. . . The Board's order, based upon such thorough consid-
eration after giving the clerk's union a chance to be heard,
will then be enforceable by the courts.49
46385 U.S. 157 (1966).
47M. at 159.
4 8 Transportaton-Comun. Union v. Union Pac. Ry., 349 F.2d 408 (10th Cir.
1965).
49 385 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1966) (citation omitted).
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The effect of the ruling was to require the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board to resolve this trilateral dispute through a joinder process.
The Board was required to consider the interests of all parties involved
whether or not they participated.
Because the Court's decision in Tranisportation-Cominunications
Employees Union was based on the Railway Labor Act, the decision
would not necessarily be controlling in a case arising under the NLRA.
However, an examination of the Court's opinion reveals an analysis
couched in terms broad enough to be applied easily to all trilateral
jurisdictional disputes. One proponent of this procedure has sum-
marized it as follows:
We may now anticipate the Court's ultimate sanctioning of
an arbitral joinder procedure under which arbitrators (not
courts) would be recognized to possess a first-instance proce-
dural jurisdiction to deny the arbitrability of work-assignment
grievances unless the grieving union shall also sanction
inclusion in the hearing, as a 'party,' of any other union
claimant. Refusal to join as a party in those circumstances,
rejecting the correlative right thereafter to participate in
designating another arbitrator before whom the issue may be
heard on the merits, should foreclose the declining union from
later reopening the issue before the Labor Board. Its day
in court will have come and gone10
Therefore, Justice Black's opinion provides a basis for resolving
the problems created by Carey and by the NLRB's inconsistency.
Unless it is followed in jurisdictional dispute cases arising under the
NLRA, the employer must continue to utilize the unit clarification
petition for relief.
IV. ABUSES OF THE UNIT CLARIFICATION PROCEDURE
In many cases labor unions have attempted to use the unit clarifi-
cation petition to sidestep the freedom of choice guaranteed to all
employees by the National Labor Relations Act. Although unions
presumably represent the best interests of employees, in many situations
they have interests divergent from those of the workers they represent.
Thus, by requesting a particular bargaining unit, "the union may be
seeking not so much to vindicate employee interests as to sweep
additional employees into its jurisdiction or, simply, to prevent a rival
union from organizing a group of employees which it wants for itself." r"
50 E. JONES, A SEQUEL IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRILATERAL ARBITRATION OF
JURISDICTIONAL LABOR DISPUTES-THE SUPREME COURT'S GIFT TO EMBATTLED EM-
PLOYERS, 894-95 (U. Calif. Inst. of Indus. Relations Reprint No. 188 1968).
51 Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable
Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 479, 485 (1967).
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During initial organization campaigns the union will usually petition
for a bargaining unit composed only of groups that it feels it can
successfully organize. Although the Act specifically prohibits using
extent of organization as a controlling factor in unit determinations, 2
many of the country's leading labor authorities seriously question the
NLRB's adherence to this statutory mandate. 3
Once it acquires representation rights the union will continue to
strive to enhance the size of the unit. The search for additional dues-
paying members is often made at the expense of both rival unions and
employee freedom. The unit clarification petition provides a strong
weapon in the union's arsenal. Although a section 9(c) (1) repre-
sentation election protects the employee's freedom of choice, it allows
rival unions to challenge the incumbent union's right to be the exclusive
representative, whereas the unit clarification petition permits the union
to increase the size of the bargaining unit without giving the employees
an opportunity to change or eliminate representatives.
The line between the use and abuse of this generally desirable
procedure can be maintained only by an impartial National Labor
Relations Board. Until recently, the Labor Board has drawn the line
with care. For example, in Gould National Batteries, Inc.,' the Board
preserved the rights guaranteed to unrepresented employees by the
NLRA " when it dismissed a unit clarification petition which sought
to combine one unit of 276 unionized employees with two units com-
prised of 117 unrepresented workers.
Another situation in which the unit clarification petition may be
abused is where a technical accretion has occurred, but the union has
long "slept on their rights." In one case, for example, the union had
gained representation rights to all clerical employees.56 Three years
later a unit clarification petition was filed alleging that certain "coders"
2 "In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in sub-
section (b) the extent to which employees have organized shall not be controlling."
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1964).
53 One commentator has stated that:
An examination of the cases that have dealt with contested bargaining unit
questions supports the conclusion that the Board has a pronounced tendency
to establish as appropriate whatever unit most reflects the extent of the union's
organizational success, regardless of other considerations.
Rains, Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the NLRB: A Lack
of Objectivity Perceived, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 175, 176 (1967).
rA 157 N.L.R.B. 679 (1966). See also Kaiser Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 547 (1944), in which
the union, which represented 2,000 employees, alleged that the 1,000 newly hired
personnel represented an accretion to the existing unit. The Board denied the unit
clarification petition and ruled that the new employees were entitled to a representation
election.
55 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
50 Remington Rand Div. of Sperry Rand, 132 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1961).
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were an accretion to the existing unit. The Board held that because
the disputed employees had been in existence since the original certifica-
cation and the union had never requested representation rights, it
waived its rights to gain representation by means of an accretion.
5 7
The proper procedure would be a section 9 (c) (1) election.8
This so-called "waiver" or "estoppel doctrine" has been used in-
frequently, but effectively, to prevent a misuse of the unit clarification
petition. In Beaunit Fibers, Inc."9 the union's original certification
covered all plant and maintenance personnel. In practice, however,
bargaining was conducted on behalf of only those employees receiving
hourly wages. In a unit clarification petition the union requested repre-
sentation rights for the salaried plant and maintenance employees, but
the Board held that the union's inaction constituted a waiver and dis-
missed the petition because a question of representation now existed.
The waiver doctrine is necessary to control the clarification pro-
cedure, but the determination of when it is applicable is a frustrating
endeavor."° As with the equity docrine of laches, some flexibility is
necessary, but it would be reasonable for Congress to require the Board
to set forth basic guidelines to which interested parties may look. 1
Traditionally the unit clarification petition has served a useful and
desirable function.' Where the parties dispute a certain job classifica-
tion, or where there is an alleged accretion to the existing bargaining
unit, the clarification procedure has been valuable. It has provided the
flexibility necessary in a dynamic employment relationship. But it is
also clear that the unit clarification petition has the potential to distort
and disrupt industrial relations. Used improperly, it could be a severe
7Id.
58See Standard Oil Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1964); General Elec. Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 1233 (1958).
59 153 N.L.R.B. 987 (1965) ; cf. FWD Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 404 (1961), in which the
employer and the union, throughout the 19-year bargaining history, had frequently
changed the size of the unit. Finally the union petitioned for clarification of certain
employees. The Board found that the unit represented by the petitioner was "too
indeterminate" to permit resolving by motion for clarification the question of the
disputed employees.
0 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 1968-2 CCII NLRB Dec.
25,458 (1968).
61 See Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 70 L.R.R.M. 1262
(1969).
6 Once it has been determined that the unit clarification is the proper procedure,
the Board will issue an order designed to clarify the existing ambiguity. The question
then is when the order will take effect. Because disputed employees may be covered by
a particular collective bargaining agreement, and because the NLRB cannot, under
§ 8(d) of the NLRA, in most circumstances, force the parties to change the terms of
a current agreement, the Board's order might not be effective until the termination date
of the contract. However, in Smith Steel Workers, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1969), the
Board split on other issues, but unanimously felt that a unit clarification order takes
effect immediately, because it does not change or modify a current collective bargaining
agreement, but corrects such a contract.
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obstacle to the freedom of choice guaranteed to employees by the NLRA.
The deciding factor is the impartiality and judgment exercised by the
National Labor Relations Board. In the past, the limitations imposed
on the use of the procedure have, to a large extent, been able to protect
the rights of the employer, the labor organization and, most importantly,
the employees. Recent developments, however, have given cause for
great concern. As a veteran of the NLRB staff has stated: "The unit
decisions consistently encourage the growth of unionism as such, rather
than protect the rights of employees." I The next section of this article
examines these recent developments to determine the real extent of the
truth of this comment.
V. THE NEW USE OF THE UNIT CLARIFICATION PROCEDURE
A. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co."
Since its inception the unit clarification petition has been used only
where there has been some change in the employment pattern. The
creation of a new job classification, the movement of personnel, or
the acquisition of a new plant have all involved some change which
would clearly affect the delineation of the existing bargaining unit.
Where, however, there has been no change in the employment pattern,
the Board has found no need to clarify the bargaining unit. Un-
fortunately the decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford completely ignored
these precedents.
There were ten company plants involved in Libbey-Owens-Ford,
all of which were engaged in the production and fabrication of glass
and glass products. Eight of these plants constituted one multiplant
unit for which the United Glass and Ceramic Workers' Union was the
certified representative.0 5 The remaining two plants, one located at
Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, and the other at Lathrop, California, were
each separate bargaining units. Both of these units were also repre-
sented by the Glass Workers. The multiplant unit has been in existence
since 1939, the Brackenbridge unit since 1943, and the Lathrop unit
since 1962. Although certified as the representative for the multiplant
unit, the union had only received voluntary recognition by the employer
for the two single plant units. In 1961, before the Lathrop plant was
63 K. McGuINESS, THE NEW FRONTIER NLRB 97 (1963) (emphasis added).
64 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,001 (1968). This decision was
reaffirmed and the election results certified in Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 173
N.L.R.B. No. 187, 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,659 (1968).
05 Employees who were responsible for glass cutting operations were represented
in a separate unit by the Window Glass Cutters League of America.
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in operation, the union requested inclusion of the employees at Lathrop
in the multiplant unit. The company refused. Subsequently, a col-
lective bargaining agreement recognized Lathrop as a separate bar-
gaining unit. In the 1965 multiplant negotiations the Glass Workers
demanded the inclusion of both Brackenridge and Lathrop in the bar-
gaining unit. But the employer again refused the requested expansion,
leaving the three units covered by separate collective bargaining
contracts.
The union, unable to obtain its objectives through the process of
good faith bargaining, filed a unit clarification petition asking the
NLRB to consolidate the three units into one multiplant bargaining
unit. The petition did not allege a dispute over job classifications, an
accretion, or any other change from the previously existing employment
pattern. Voting three-to-two, 6 the Board granted the clarification,
ordering elections to be held in the single plant units to determine if the
employees favored consolidation. Hoping to enjoin the election,
Libbey-Owens-Ford filed a motion for summary judgment in the Fed-
eral District Court for the District of Columbia. In granting the mo-
tion,' the court concluded that: "[T]he National Labor Relations
Board acted in excess of, and contrary to, the statutory authority con-
ferred on it in the National Labor Relations Act." " The Board filed
an appeal before the circuit court which, in a two-to-one decision,
reversed the injunction on the grounds that the lower court lacked juris-
diction to entertain the motion. 9 The United States Supreme Court
recently denied the employer's petition for certiorari.7
The NLRB decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. raises a
number of important issues. The most prominent is whether the unit
clarification can properly be used to consolidate existing bargaining
units. The earliest Board decision involving this issue was Chrysler
Corp.,71 in which the United Automobile Workers filed a motion to
consolidate three separate units. In granting the motion the Board
relied on the fact that the parties treated the three units as one, that
the terms of one contract applied to all units, and the extent of
organization. Because the first two facts were not present in Libbey-
Owens-Ford, and because the NLRB is barred from considering the
006Board members McCulloch, Brownm and Zagoria were the majority, while
members Fanning and Jenkins dissented.
07 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. McCulloch, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 21,172 (D.
D.C. 1968).
681d. at 21,176.
69 McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
70 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
7142 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1942) ; see Western Union Tel. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 110 (1945);
Wfrest Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 814 (1943).
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extent of organization as a controlling factor,72 this early Board deci-
sion is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
No prior NLRB decisions are directly on point. However, a sim-
ilar situation existed in St. Regis,"- a case decided by the NLRB
Regional Director for the Sixth Region. The Pulp and Sulphite
Workers filed a motion for unit clarification in which they sought
consolidation of several separate units. The regional director properly
denied the motion, concluding that:
While the International's Motion is styled as one for unit
clarification, it is apparent from the foregoing that there is
no dispute between the parties as to unit composition or unit
description which would require clarification. Rather, the
dispute between the parties centers about the scope of the
unit and thereby places in issue the basic appropriateness of
five individual units . . . , as opposed to a single multi-plant
unit. The International, by its Motion, is in effect requesting
that a determination be made of a question concerning repre-
sentation in a unit which it claims to be appropriate. The
Board, however, has consistently held that the policies of the
Act and of the Board require that such matters be determined
through the filing of a petition in a representation pro-
ceeding."4
The Board did not discuss the St. Regis case in the Libbey-Owens-Ford
decision. In the NLRB's brief before the court of appeals, however, it
was argued that these two cases were distinguishable due to the fact
that the units in the St. Regis case were represented by the various
locals and not by the International Union.75 Admittedly, this is a valid
factual distinction. But the regional director's reasoning was based
on the fact that there was no dispute concerning unit composition or
description which would require clarification-a fact that was common
to both cases.7"
From the preceding discussion of the traditional use of the unit
clarification, it is apparent that the Board developed the procedure
to clarify a unit description which, because of a change in the employ-
ment pattern, had become ambiguous and was disputed. In Libbey-
Owens-Ford there was no change in the employment pattern and no
7
.
2 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
73 St. Regis Paper Co., No. 6-R-1193 (N.L.R.B. Director for 6th Region, 1967).
74Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
75 Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,
403 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
76 St. Regis is a weak precedent, having been decided by the regional director,
rather than by the NLRB.
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ambiguity or dispute over unit description. Impervious to these ob-
vious facts, the Board still proceeded to "clarify" the units. In previous
cases the Board strongly condemned such a misuse of the unit clari-
fication petition. In Bath Iron Works Corp.," for example, the com-
pany had two operating divisions, each separately represented by the
same union. Subsequent to a merger of the divisions, the union filed a
unit clarification petition requesting that the units be combined. The
Board reasoned that:
It is clear from the above that the changes in corporate
reorganization have not effected such changes in the status of
the employees as would require us to find that the two units
have been merged .... For these reasons and because of the
outstanding contracts, we conclude that the issues raised here
are not properly to be resolved at this time in this type
of proceeding.78
Considering the fact that there was no change in the status of the
employees of the Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. (there was not even
the corporate reorganization which took place in Bath Iron Works)
and that the outstanding contracts specifically recognized separate bar-
gaining units, it is difficult to reconcile these cases. Instead of attempt-
ing to reconcile or distinguish them, the Board cited Bath Iron Works
in support of their position.70
If we again examine the traditional application of the clarification
procedure, another deviation from precedent in Libbey-Owens-Ford
becomes apparent. The Glass and Ceramic Workers gained certifica-
tion of the multiplant unit in 1939, and voluntary recognition in the
single plant units in 1943 and 1962. During the organizational cam-
paigns in the single plant unit, the union had the right to request a
single multiplant bargaining unit. The filing of a section 9(c) (1)
representation petition would have properly given the NLRB jurisdic-
tion to determine the appropriate bargaining unit. However, the Glass
Workers "slept on their rights." On the basis of prior Board decisions,
the waiver doctrine should have prevented this so-called clarification.
Another form of estoppel has been used to prevent an employer,
who had specifically recognized certain employees in a contract coverage
clause, from using the unit clarification to exclude them at a later time °
In Libbey-Owens-Ford, the bargaining units had separate and distinct
77 Bath Iron Works Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1965).
7 8
1d. at 1070-71.
79Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec.
29,003 (1968).
80 See Sangamo Elec. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1310 (1955).
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contracts each containing a coverage clause applicable only to the
respective unit. In other words, the union had specifically recognized
and accepted the existence of three separate bargaining units. The
majority opinion does not explain the reason that a union is able to
escape from a contract that would estop the employer. It appears that
the Board has disregarded precedent and ignored the intended and
proper use of the clarification procedure. Whether or not it was wise
to disregard precedent is, at best, questionable. It does seem, however,
that the Board should have explained its action. Yet even a more basic
question remains-does the Board have the statutory authority to use
the unit clarification petition to consolidate units?
1. The Question of Authority
Counsel for Libbey-Owens-Ford argued that since it is admitted
that no question of representation exists, the NLRB has no jurisdic-
tional basis to determine the scope of the bargaining unit."' Hence,
the Board has no statutory authority to reshape the unit by consolida-
tion. The employer also argued that if section 9 is read as a whole,
the word "case" in the provision in section 9 (b) 82 means a case where a
representation question exists. Lastly, the company argued that since
subparagraph (5) of subsection (c) specifically limits the authority
granted in section 9(b),' it is apparent that unit determinations are
restricted to cases arising under section 9(c). Therefore, section
9(c) (1) limits the Board's authority to designate appropriate units to
cases in which a question of representation exists.
Answering these arguments, the General Counsel for the Board
stated that "the Act provides the Board with implied authority to
entertain this kind of petition notwithstanding the absence of a question
of representation . . . ... He reasoned that since section 9(b) does
not specifically limit unit determinations to cases involving a repre-
sentation question, the Board has implied authority to decide purely
unit disputes, "since changed circumstances can create unit disputes
8 1 Brief for Employer for Rehearing and Oral Argument at 6-9, Libbey-Owens-
Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,001 (1968).
82
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof . ...
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
83 § 9(c) (5) of the NLRA, supra note 44.
84 Brief for Appellant at 12, McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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without at the same time raising new questions of representation." 85
Therefore, there must be a procedure to handle such situations. Un-
fortunately, the General Counsel neglected to illustrate any "changed
circumstances" which would warrant Board intervention.
Unwilling to accept the employer's arguments, the majority of
the NLRB stated:
We find no merit in the Employer's position that the
union was required to resort to a representation proceeding
to resolve the issue ...
If the overall 10-plant unit sought and the existing single-
plant units are all presumptively appropriate, it is not a diffi-
cult matter for the Board to make available to the employees
in each of the hitherto separately represented plants an oppor-
tunity to express their preferences in a secret ballot election
between continued representation in their one-plant units,
or addition to the multi-plant unit. And the current contracts
for those separate plants interpose no bar to such separate self-
determination elections because the purpose of this proceeding
is not to affect existing contracts, but to mark out the appro-
priate unit for future bargaining....
We conclude from the above review of outstanding
principles and the arguments herein that the Petitioner has
adopted a procedure which would appear to encompass its
desired relief. We are unable to perceive any reason why a
further delay should be required where, as here, no question
of the presumptive propriety of the employer-wide unit exists
and only the technical problems of bargaining history and
employer opposition have prevented its establishment."
The reasoning of the majority circumvents the arguments presented
by the employer, and the dissenting members are quick to point this out.
[The majority] ignore the fact that the void they undertake
to fill-"to mark out the appropriate unit for future bar-
gaining" without affecting existing contracts and, obviously,
without reference to a representation issue-is a statutory
void. Authorization for this type of election is completely
lacking under the Act. Representation is not in issue in this
case. Unit scope is."
Furthermore, the dissenters concluded, employer opposition is not a
mere "technical problem," 88 but, rather, it is a factor to be considered
seriously and the existence of such opposition does not "justify ration-
85Id.
86Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 NLRB No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec.
29,003 (1968) (emphasis added).
871d. at 29,005.
88 Id. at 29,006.
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alizing the existence of the requisite authority for solution by the
employees." 89
The decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford reveals another conflict be-
tween the Board members concerning the existence of a requisite statu-
tory authority. In granting the Union's clarification petition, the
Board ordered a secret ballot election be held in the two single plant
units. They reasoned that the statute contains no prohibition against
giving "some weight to employee preference." "' On the contrary, they
argued, Congress approved the use of such self-determination elections 91
as evidenced by section 9 (b)'s requirement of offering professional and
craft employees the right to such elections. The dissenters, however,
took the view that "there simply is no present statutory authority for
permitting employees to decide, in a representational vacuum, which
contract unit they wish." 92 They first based their view on the fact
that self-determination elections have only been used in connection with
the selection of a bargaining representative which arises in a section
9(c) (1) representation proceeding. Second, they stated that the 1947
(Taft-Hartley) amendments to the Act, which allowed self-determina-
tion elections by professional and craft employees, were actually linita-
tions imposed by Congress on the Board's power to define units. These
Congressional limitations are further exemplified by section 9(e) (1)
which requires a secret ballot election to determine whether a labor
organization's authority to negotiate a union shop agreement should
be rescinded.93 The dissent concluded that "these statutory realities
are ignored by the majority." ' This is the same position taken by
the dissent in the appellate court.
The Board's decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford is disturbing not only
because it contravenes Congressional intent, but also because it limits,
rather than expands, both the freedom of association and the adherence
to free collective bargaining which the Act espouses. The United Glass
Workers' interest in the larger unit stems from the natural desire of
unions to insulate their position against rival unions. By means of
s9 Id.
90 Id. at 29,004.
9DSee Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
92Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,001
(1968).
93 In addition to the election authorized by § 9(c) (1) and § 9(e) (1), §209 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 179 (1964), allows such an election in national
emergency disputes to determine whether the employees wish to accept the final offer
of settlement made by the employer.
94 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,001
(1968).
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the unit clarification petition, the NLRB helped the Glass Workers
repel the Teamsters, who had already made overtures to the employees
in the Lathrop, California, plant and who may well have found a place
on the ballot in a representative election. Thus, not only did the
Board's novel procedure favor one union over another, but it effectively
denied the employees their full rights to choose their representatives.
Moreover, far from giving the employees the "fullest freedom" (as
the majority of the Board averred), this decision limited not only the
freedom of the employees in the two single-unit plants, but those found
in the multi-unit plants as well. It is logical to assume that the 8,237
employees in the multiplant unit would be as greatly affected by the
consolidation as the 835 employees in the two single plant units, since
an enlarged bargaining unit would increase the problem of changing
bargaining representatives in future years. Yet the 8,237 employees
had no voice in the election which determined whether two plants
should be added to their bargaining unit.
This case involves yet another disturbing problem-the disruption
and destruction of free collective bargaining. Beginning with the enact-
ment of the Wagner Act in 1935,"' Congress emphasized that the inter-
ests of the nation were best served by a system of free collective
bargaining. An examination of the statutes and of the expressions
of legislative intent 9 which accompany them indicate a Congressional
purpose of minimizing government regulation. Under a system of free
collective bargaining, government regulation must be aimed at facilitat-
ing the agreement-making process. "Thus, the determination of the
appropriate bargaining unit... must be confined to encouraging settle-
ment without outside intervention." 97
The majority's decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford shows a disregard
of our free collective bargaining system. In the 1961 multiplant con-
tract negotiations, the union requested inclusion of the Lathrop, Cali-
fornia plant (which did not begin operations until 1962) in the
multiplant unit. The company refused the request, but, in turn, had
to concede to other union demands. Subsequently, a separate contract
which covered only the Lathrop plant was negotiated and was in effect
at the time of the Board decision. During the next multiplant negotia-
tions in 1965 the union again requested inclusion of the Lathrop plant
and added an additional request for the Brackenridge plant as well.
95 Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449-57, as amended 29 U.S.C.
§§151-66 (1964).
96 McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
See, Daily Labor Report, June 12, 1968, at A-3.
97 p. ABODEELY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND THE NLRB 6, (U. Pa. Labor
Relations and Public Policy Series Rep. No. 1, 1968).
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The employer, again at the cost of conceding to other union demands,
refused the consolidation. Finally, the union persuaded a majority
of the NLRB to give them what they were unable to obtain through
good faith collective bargaining.
The dissenters accurately concluded that the majority opinion
in Libbey-Owens-Ford contravenes the basic policy of the National
Labor Relations Act. Section 1 of the Act provides that the policy of
the United States is "to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing . . . ." The effect of the majority's
decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford was to provide the union with the eco-
nomic power simultaneously to shut down two additional plants of the
company by striking and, thus, to obstruct additionally the free flow
of commerce. Moreover, the enlargement of the bargaining unit in-
creased the scope of negotiations and with it the scope of potential dis-
pute. By the constitution and by-laws of the United Glass Workers,
any one wage committeeman can prevent acceptance of a collective
bargaining agreement." The consolidation of the units not only in-
creased the size of the wage committee, but also provided each com-
mittee member with the power to impede, if not prevent, a settlement.
This is scarcely appropriate for the furtherance of industrial peace.
The concept of collective bargaining-"of two powers seeking
their respective goals in a free and open market" 9 -is a workable
solution which depends on minimal external intervention. In October
of 1968, Libbey-Owens-Ford began new multiplant negotiations with
the union. The consolidation of units was again requested and the
employer, wanting the union to concede on other demands, offered to
merge the Lathrop plant. This offer, and the union's decision to accept
it, were directed by the economic realities of the market place-realities
that were ignored by the Board's decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford.
B. Aftermath of Libbey-Owens-Ford
The National Labor Relations Board decision in the Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Co. case has provided the unions with an immensely
powerful economic weapon. After using the threat of consolidation
during collective bargaining to force the employer to make concessions,
the union can petition the Board to merge the units. But the impact
98 Brief for the Employer at 32, PPG Industries, Inc., Case No. 6-UC-8 (NLRB,
filed Dec. 9, 1966).
99 P. ABODEELY, supra note 97, at 6.
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of the decision is also felt as early as the union's organizational
campaigns.
For example, a union decides to organize two plants of an
employer. It is apparent to the organizer that the union has
a better chance of winning at plant "A" than at plant "B". It
therefore petitions for a single unit at plant "A" and after
winning the election is certified on a single unit basis. Later
when chances of success at plant "B" seems brighter, it peti-
tions for an election at plant "B" on a single unit basis. It
wins the election and is certified, again on a single-plant unit
basis. It then petitions for clarification of the unit to include
both plants. The process can continue ad infinitum as the
union continues to "nibble away" at the employer. Such a
procedure does not lead to industrial stability-it leads to
chaos, confusion and conflict.10 0
Labor organizations, aware of the potential of the Libbey-Owens-
Ford decision, have not hesitated to use it. The United Glass and
Ceramic Workers, after its success against Libbey-Owens-Ford, filed a
unit clarification petition against PPG Industries, Inc.' The petition
sought to consolidate three single plant units with one multiplant
unit. As in the earlier case, the union had attempted to obtain con-
solidation in every multiplant contract negotiation in the period from
1954-1966. The company, at the expense of conceding to other union
demands, refused the requested expansion. Since the two cases may
not be factually distinguished,"0 2 the NLRB may well grant the
union's request.'
100 Brief for Employer at 48, PPG Industries, Inc., No. 6-UC-8 (N.L.R.B.,
filed Dec. 9, 1966).
101 PPG Industries, Inc., No. 6-UC-8 (N.L.R.B., filed Dec. 9, 1966). On
May 22, 1968, the Regional Director transferred the case to the Board without
rendering an opinion.
102 In the employer's brief it was alleged that: "The Libbey-Owens-Ford decision
is distinguishable from the instant case since it did not involve the merger of separately
certified bargaining units." Brief for Employer at 41. However, in view of the deci-
sion in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1964), it is question-
able whether this argument would be accepted by the Board.
103 During the March, 1969, multiplant negotiations, the union again demanded
consolidation of the 3 single plant units with the multiplant unit. When the com-
pany refused this demand, the union then requested a 30 day differential between
the termination date of the 4 bargaining contracts. After considerable negotiation,
termination dates with a differential were agreed upon. In the memorandum of
agreement, the company promised that if, prior to February 16, 1972, the court issued
a final decision ordering consolidation and if the employees at each plant voted in an
election to join the multiplant unit, all contracts would terminate on February 16,
1972. In return, it was agreed that should the NLRB render a decision unfavorable
to the company, the union will take such action as may be necessary to make it possible
for the company to appeal to the courts. See Memorandum of Agreement Between
PPG Industries, Inc. and United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America,
AFL-CIO, Canadian Labour Congress, at 1, March 26, 1969.
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Recently, the American Cyanamid Corporation has been con-
fronted with a similar situation.'4  In 1962, 1966, and again in March
of 1968, the union requested the merger of separate bargaining units.
Upon the company's refusal, the union called for a strike. This proved
unsuccessful, and the labor organization filed a unit clarification peti-
tion. In response, the employer filed a motion to dismiss and, alterna-
tively, a motion to reschedule the case after the Board renders a decision
in PPG. Although refusing the former, the Board did grant the latter
motion. It is therefore possible that the PPG case will be used to
redefine or possibly, overrule the Libbey-Owens-Ford decision. If
PPG does not overrule Libbey-Owens-Ford, it is extremely doubtful
that American Cyanamid would reverse it, since American Cyanamid is
factually distinguishable from Libbey-Owens-Ford because the company
there has no history of multiplant bargaining.
The latest case involving the unit clarification procedure was again
initiated by the United Glass and Ceramic Workers."0 5 The petitioner
was the certified representative in a three-plant unit and in a separate,
single plant unit consisting of employees of the American Saint Gobain
Corporation. After unsuccessfully demanding unit consolidation during
bargaining negotiations, the union filed the unit clarification petition,
basing its arguments on the Board's decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford.
The union's brief, submitted to the regional director, maintained that
the present situation and the situation which existed in Libbey-Owes-
Ford were "substantially on all fours on the facts." 10 The employer,
after alleging the impropriety of the Libbey-Owens-Ford decision,
attempted to distinguish the cases, by arguing that whereas the consoli-
dation in Libbey-Owens-Ford would create an employer-wide bargain-
ing unit, a presumptively appropriate unit under the Act, a merger
here would not result in a similar unit."' The difference is explained
by two facts-the company owned a fifth plant in which the workers
were represented by other unions, and the Window Glass Cutter's
League of America had representation rights for all glass cutters em-
ployed in the multiplant unit plants. It is interesting to note that the
Glass Cutters filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings and were
granted permission by the hearing officer over objections by the
petitioner. Although the same union represented some of the glass
104 American Cyanamid Corp., No. 2-UC-20 (N.L.R.B., filed July 16, 1968).
10 5 American Saint Gobain Corp., No. 6-UC-23 (N.L.R.B., filed Sept. 11, 1968).
106 Brief for Union at 24, American Saint Gobain Corp., No. 6-UC-23 (N.L.R.B.,
filed Sept. 11, 1968).
107 Brief for Employer at 6-7, American Saint Gobain Corp., No. 6-UC-23
(N.L.R.B., filed Sept. 11, 1968).
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cutter employees in the Libbey-Owens-Ford case, it did not attempt to
intervene there.
The decisions in American Cyanamid, PPG, American Saint
Gobain, and other cases 108 will determine the future of the unit clari-
fication petition. The nature of the petition, the National Labor
Relations Act, the system of free collective bargaining, and public policy
all dictate that the Labor Board reverse its decision in Libbey-Owens-
Ford. Barring a change in NLRB membership, this is not likely to
occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
The unit clarification petition was developed as an instrument of
flexibility which was demanded by the dynamics of the employment rela-
tionship and the goals of the NLRA. Where there is a disputed job
classification or an allegation of an accretion, the clarification procedure
provides an expedient and valuable means of resolution. But even where
changes existed in the employment pattern, limitations and controls on
the procedure were found to be necessary. Decisions like General Box
Co.0 9 and doctrines such as estoppel prevented the unit clarification
petition from being misused by either or both parties. The early deci-
sions of the Board showed an awareness of the potentially destructive
effects of a procedure which might deny the employees their freedom
of choice. The decision in Libbey-Owens-Ford ignores this without
providing an explanation for such an abrupt reversal of policy.
It is difficult to imagine that a consolidation of previously existing,
separate bargaining units was envisioned as a function of the clarifica-
tion petition. Such a use constitutes a drastic and unwarranted change
from the intended and traditional uses of the unit clarification petition.
Moreover, "clarifying" units by consolidating them ignores the controls
and limitations on the procedure which have always been recognized as
necessary to prevent abuses. By substituting NLRB fiat for collective
1 0 8 The United States Steel Corporation was recently involved in a unit clarifica-
tion proceeding in which the Industrial Police Association requested consolidation of
4 separate single plant units. The Regional Director found that the representatives
at each plant were separate and distinct labor organizations involved in a strictly
jurisdictional dispute. He then concluded that:
The issue thus presented is not concerned with who represents the em-
ployees in the certified units or whether existing single-plant units should be
merged into a multiplant unit, but rather who will conduct contract negotia-
tions on behalf of employees in the existing units. I find that such a question,
which involves solely and in a peculiar fashion the internal affairs of the four
certified unions, can best be resolved by the parties themselves and is not,
under the circumstances, cognizable under the Board's amendment or clarifica-
tion of unit procedures.
United States Steel Corp., 68 L.R.R.M. 1056 (N.L.R.B. Director for 6th Region (1968)
(footnotes omitted).
10982 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949).
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bargaining, and by denying both employees and employers their rights
under the Act, the Libbey-Owens-Ford decision contravenes public
policy. In his bitter dissent, Judge Tamm of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit critically remarked:
The case illustrates the consistent tendency of administrative
agencies to assume and exercise by accretion powers not
granted to them specifically or by necessary implication.
Undoubtedly, in most instances, this grasping for non-author-
ized powers is motivated by a sincere desire to perform more
effective and efficient functions. I believe that the courts must
insist, however, that the administrative agencies confine their
operations specifically to those fields of activity which are
bounded by the statutes which create their authority and
authorize their operations. If additional power or functions
are essential to a proper discharge of an agency's responsi-
bilities, those powers or functions should not be self-created
but should be sought from the Congress.n1
11o McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F2d 916, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (dissenting opinion).
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